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At the sitting of 13 May 1991 the President of the European Parliament announced 
that he had forwarded the motion for a resolution by Mr Staes on the human 
rights situation and the war in Sudan pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of 
Procedure (formerly Rule 63), to the Political Affairs Committee as the 
committee responsible and to the Committee on Development and Cooperation for 
its opinion. 
At its meeting of 15-17 July 1991 the committee decided to draw up a report and 
at its meeting of 12 November 1991 it appointed Mr Crampton rapporteur. 
At its meetings of 26 February 1993, 7 October 1993 and 22 November 1993 the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security considered the draft report. 
At the last meeting it adopted the resolution unopposed with 3 abstentions. 
The following took part in the vote: Baron Crespo, chairman; Cassanmagnago 
Cerretti, first vice-chairman; Aglietta, Avgerinos, Bertens, Canavarro, Galle 
(for Woltjer), Gunther, Habsburg, Holzfuss, Lacaze, Langer, Llorca Vilaplana, 
Newens, Penders and Trivelli. 
The opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation is attached to this 
report. 
The report was tabled on 24 November 1993. 
The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
resolution on the situation in Sudan 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to its resolutions of 29 October 19921 , 19 November 19922, 
11 February 19933 and 22 A?ril 19934 on the violation of human rights in 
Sudan, and of 9 April 1992 on famine in Africa and Sudan, 
having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr STAES on the human rights 
situatirm and Ll.e war i·. Sudan (B3-0217/91), 
having ~egard tJ Rule 4r of the Rules of Procedure, 
having ~egard tc the rer1rt of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security 
and the opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation (A3-
0366/93), 
A. whereas the Sudan is dally the scene of gross violations of human rights by 
the Government, which seeks to impose its version of Islam on the whole 
populatlon including the Christian and animist population of the South and 
those many Muslims who are opposed to the Government's interpretation of 
their religion, 
B. aware that various factions of the SPLA opposition forces are also guilty 
of gross violations of human rights, 
c. recognizing that the main cause of these disasters has been the attempt by 
successive governments in Khartoum to impose dictatorial rule and Islamic 
law on the animist and Christian population of Southern Sudan, but that the 
rebel leaders in the South have, especially by their internal rivalries, 
contributed to the disaster, 
D. aware that as a consequence of the disastrous policies of the government and 
the reselting cjvil war 3lmost three million people have been deliberately 
displaced from their homes by the warring parties, sometimes being forcibly 
relocated with no warning to virtually unlivable areas, and that many are 
living on famine foods gathered in the wild and food relief provided by the 
United Nations and humanitarian organizations, 
E. appalled by the implementation of a strict interpretation of Sharia law, 
which grossly discriminates against women and non-Muslims and which inflicts 
penalties such as executions by beheading and amputation for those judged 
guilty of some non-capital crimes, 
OJ No. C 305, 23.11.1992, p. 150 
2 OJ No. C 337, 21.12.1992, p. 204 
3 OJ No. C 72, 15.3. 1993, p. 126 
4 OJ No. C 150, 31.5.1993, p. 265 
5 OJ No. C 125, 18.5.1992, p. 233 
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F. aware that slavery still exists in parts of the country, 
G. aware that 85% of the rural population live in extreme poverty and that the 
rural infrastructure is rapidly being destroyed, 
H. outraged at the persecution of the people of Juba, and the ethnic cleansing 
style campaign being carried out against the Nuba and Dinka people, which 
has involved thousands of extrajudicial executions, 
I. shocked at the total lack of basic freedoms: of speech, the press, religion, 
trade unions, and human rights organisations in Sudan, 
J. disgusted at the violent obstructions to aid efforts inflicted by both the 
government and SPLA factions, including the execution of European Commission 
staff member Mark Laboke Jenner, 
K. alarmed at the supply of weapons to the Sudanese government by Iran and 
China, and the training in civil suppression techniques by Iran, 
L. alarmed by the evidence that Islamic fanatics from other countries are using 
Sudan as a base from which to inflict neighbouring countries with terrorism, 
M. shocked by the pressure exerted on NGOs, which are trying to help suffering 
men, women and children, to organize their activities to suit the political 
and religious aims of the Sudanese Government, 
1. Insists that while these appalling abuses of human rights continue, no 
assistance, other than emergency food and medical aid delivered under the 
control of the EC or its Member States, should be provided by the EC and 
that the Union should take steps to start the process of expelling Sudan 
from the Lome Treaty; 
2. Calls on the Sudanese government to respect the UN's Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the Organisation of African Unity's African Charter on 
Human and People's rights and Article 5 of the Lome Convention; 
3. Calls on all the warring parties to honour the humanitarian principles 
enshrined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 governing the treatment of 
persons taking no active part in hostilities, 
4. Urges the establishment of a genuine ceasefire and resumption of peace 
talks, with human rights explicitly included as central in any negotiations, 
5. Stresses the responsibility of the United Nations to promote a cease-fire 
and to be ready to provide observers to monitor any cease-fire agreement; 
6. Calls for the Sudanese government and the SPLA to allow the free movement 
of people throughout Sudan, and for an end to involuntary relocation of 
people, 
7. Calls for the establishment of corridors of peace- specific agreed overland 
routes in Southern Sudan - for civilians to leave besieged areas, and to 
allow food aid to reach those most in need, 
8. Calls on the Sudanese government and SPLA forces to halt obstructions to 
donor organizations, and allow immediate safe access by land, river and air 
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to aid organizations, 
9. Calls for the removal of the ban on the original Sudan Human Rights 
Organisation, the Sudan Bar Association, and other human rights 
organisations, and the release of Dr. Ahmed Osman Siraj, a political 
prisoner and trustee of the SHRO; 
10. Calls for the government to account for Mohamed Nowar Aso, arrested in 1990, 
and not seen since, for Karshum Mana Atia, who disappeared in late 1992, and 
for Parmena Chat Arou and Mali Amoul, both of whom disappeared in Khartoum; 
11 . Calls for the release of the following political prisoners: Dr. Ibrahim el-
Amin, ex-Cabinet member, Abdel-Rasoul el-Nour, former governor of Kordofan, 
Fadlalla Burma Nasir, former Minister of Defence, Mirghani Abdel Rahman -
former Minister of Trade, Yousif Hussein, Communist Party Central Committee 
member, Farouk Ali Zakaria, Communist Party Central Committee member, 
Mukhtar Abdallah, trade union leader, Al-Haj Abdel Rahmen Nugdalla, former 
Minister of Religious Affairs and Samuel Garang, engineer; 
12. Calls for an end to the persecution of women and non-Muslims under the 
Sharia laws, and a halt to the executions, amputations and other such 
penalties allowed under these laws; 
13. Calls for an immediate halt to the persecution of the Nuba and Dinka 
peoples, which amounts to ethnic cleansing; 
14. Calls for the government to account for the more than one hundred people who 
disappeared in Juba in the summer of 1992, and the hundreds who have 
disappeared since; 
15. Urges the restoration of religious freedoms; 
16. Calls on the Union and its Member States to grant asylum to those Sudanese 
known to be directly threatened personally by the Sudanese Government and 
to do all in their power to assist other refugees from the Sudan by 
providing finance and supplies to the neighbouring countries giving them 
refuge and to the international agencies and NGOs working on their behalf; 
17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the 
Council, the Co-Presidents of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly, the Secretaries-
General of the UN, UNICEF, the OAU, the Arab League, and the Sudanese 
Government. 
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) 
INTBODUC'l'ION 
B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
Contemporary Africa is largely seen by the West as a disaster area. However its 
present state is not a necessity resulting simply from environmental factors. 
Africa has many natural resources, rich traditions and possible futures, in 
spite of the colonial past, and some continued unconstructive Western actions -
for example IMF imposed structural adjustment programmes which force countries 
to repay debts even at such costs as higher infant mortality. The EC should 
seek to contribute to Sudan and Africa's reemergence from the current state of 
crisis. 
Arab culture has been devalued in the contemporary Western world. 
popular lack of respect for Arab culture reflects a total ignorance 
content. Erskine Childer's comment highlights this lack of awareness: 
Yet the 
of its 
"I often wish to make a TV film in Britai.'1 standing in Trafalgar 
square, about the Arabs. It would shock a British - indeed I think any 
Western - audience to its foundations. I would point out that the name 
of the square was Arab; that the cheques passed through the banks 
around the square were named from an Arabic word and from Arab 
commercial innovation, and the numbers on them Arabic; that the drains 
running under the square had been developed in Baghdad and Cordova at 
a time when London and every city in Europe were squelching nightmares 
of mud and refuse; that the key stars in the heaven above Trafalgar 
Square are still called by the names given to them by Arab astronomers 
who discovered them at Arab observatories; that the techniques of 
navigation used by Nelson to reach the place called Trafalgar were 
first refined and codified by Arab navigators ... " 
(Erskine Childers, writing in the jubilee volume of the Netherlands-
Arabia Association 1955-1966, EJ Brill, Leiden 1966) 
I. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SUDAN: EXTREME POVERTY 
Sudan is now in the throes of ci vi 1 war and econom '.c dis as t.er. He .-1ever it was 
once a powerful country. The ancient Sudanese Kushitic kingdoms imposed their 
rule as far as Egypt. Christian rule followed, in the 6th century, to be 
succeeded by Arab rule in the 16th. Both traditlons survived, and the Arab-
Christian division now constitutes a key element of the civil war. 
Sudan's natural resources are considerable. In many parts of the south and east 
the soil is potentially rich, but shortage of water limit the size of crops 
except where the land can be irrigated from the Nile and its tributaries. Only 
15% of the country's arable land is currently under cultivation. Some of the 
best agricultural land, and much of the country's mineral wealth, including oil, 
lie in the war-torn Southern provinces. During anJ after the Second Wor-ld War 
programmes were started, with funds from the World Bank and other agencies, 
aiming to turn Sudan into a major grain exporter, tLe "Breadbasket of the Middle 
East". Tragically, Sudan is instead undergoing total crisis, due to drought, 
civil war and government mismanagement. 
FAMINE: 85% of the rural population (which make up three quarters of the 
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population), live below the absolute poverty level. Life expectancy is 51 
years. The under five child mortality rate is 172/1000, whereas in most EC 
countries it is 9-10/1000. Less than half the population have access to safe 
drinking water. Literacy levels are around 27% on average, and under 10% for 
women. 
(Figures from The State of the World's Children, 1992, UNICEF) 
In some areas in the South, the only currency is soap and salt. People are 
living as hunter-ga~herers Gn what can be scavenged, or on the aid which gets 
through. The government refuses to admit that there is a famine. "It is 
absolutely not true that people are dying of hunger" stated Hassan Turabi, 
leader of the Sudanese National Islamic Front, and the brains behind the 
military regime (Financial ~imes Interview, Wednesday April 29th, 1992) 
The harvest this year will ~e poorer than initially expected, due to lack of 
rainfall and insufficient investment in agriculture. The breakdown of rural 
infrastructure is accelerating. Government policy separates rural communities 
from trade routes, and rural communities are being destroyed. At the same time, 
the commercial export of grain continues. 
Relief: Sudan has received large amounts of aid from the West in the past, 
including mlliary ald from ~he US to the Nimeiri government (pre-85). Much of 
this aid was misguided and destructive. The Jonglei canal project, never 
finished, typifies the mistakes made. The largest mobile machine in the world, 
the Jonglei machine, lies somewhere in a Sudanese swamp. It is a specially made 
excavator to dig the Jonglei canal, to irrigate areas of Sudan by channelling 
off part of the Nile. Luckily the project, which would have caused untold 
environmental damage, was never completed as foreign exchange contributions ran 
out from the Sudanese authorities. 
Given this background, government suspicion of aid projects would be 
understandable, but hostility to donors goes far beyond suspicion. Omar Al-
Bashir regards relief agencies as relics of colonialism, and symbols of Sudan's 
lack of self-sufficiency. "Sudan will never again be a recipient of relief and 
offerings .... The energies of the Sudanese people" will be unleashed by the 
salvation revolution "so as to make them a source of vigour and power for all 
the oppressed peoples of the world" according to a Sudan News Agency report of 
an address by Lt. Gen Al-Bashir to a mass rally of students in Khartoum on 16 
Sept. 1992. Kenya Times reported on 7th September that Sudan was to send 600 
tonnes of food and 300 tonnes of medical aid and clothing to Somalia as a 
contribution to the international famine relief effort. 
The international community is attempting to address the consequences of the 
humanitarian disaster through the extensive UN relief operation called Operation 
Lifeline Sudan. 
Obstruction of relief efforts: Both government and rebels have obstructed relief 
efforts in the South: "We've got the money and we've got the grain, it's the 
politics that are the problem." Paul Mitchell of the World Food Program 
declared (quoted in Daily Telegraph, 18.7.91). Where donors are allowed to 
function, the regime attempts to use food aid to win converts to Islam, and to 
use the international presence to legitimize their actions. 
Some relief workers have been deported, accused of being subversives. The 
authorities have confirmed the execution for alleged treason, of Mark Laboke 
Jenner, who worked for the European Commission, and Andrew Tombe, an employee 
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of United States Agency for International Development. Unsurprisingly several 
agencies have withdrawn. 
Not just the government, but also the SPLA obstructs AID activity. The mission 
reported that the SPLA opened fire on food-carrying barges trying to reach 
Malakel, and that such actions against food aid were both conscious and 
deliberate. In September 1992, the SPLA summarily killed three foreign aid 
workers and a journalist. Those who died were Vilma Gomez, a Filipino nurse 
working with the US-based relief aid organisation Interaid, Tron Helge 
Hummelvoll, a Norwegian journalist, Francis Ngure, a Kenyan driver, and Myint 
Maung, a Burmese doctor, both working with UNICEF. 
Aid workers can barely function. Evidence suggests the SPLA siphons off food 
aid for its soldiers. In some areas the government makes little distinction 
between the rebel soldiers and other villagers. Their strategy seems to destroy 
whole communities in order to undermine the SPLA. They thus have no interest 
in allowing aid to reach these areas. New guidelines for aid were agreed in 
January with the Sudanese government, however they have apparently done little 
to improve the situation. 
Debt: "Sudan currently has a foreign debt amounting to US$ 13 billion, the 
equivalent of 15 years in terms of current revenues, or 200% of its GDP. And 
Sudan manages to pay annually only just 15% of its debt servicing." (Indian 
Ocean Newsletter, 26.10.91) 
II. DROUGHT AND MISMANAGEMENT OF IRRIGATION: 
Both drought and war have contributed to the disaster. In 1984 Sudan 
experienced the worst drought this century, after a 20 year period of below 
average rainfall. Irrigation schemes failed to address the country's water 
needs and often caused immense damage. In the mid 1960s the government launched 
a "Freedom from Thirst" campaign. Hundreds of boreholes were drilled to improve 
water supplies, particularly in Western Sudan, which had strong links with 
powerful political parties. The unfortunate result of these boreholes, in 
contrast to the traditionally smaller wells, was a concentration of nomads in 
those areas which led to overgrazing and erosion. 
Large scale irrigation schemes have been favoured because they are centralised, 
controllable, allow for fewer labour problems, are least affected by the weather 
and produce income from cash crops - cotton, peanuts, sugar - directly for the 
government. The policy continued in spite of World Bank findings that large-
scale irrigated agriculture in Sudan was the costliest system, and far less 
productive than traditional, rainfed mechanised agriculture, even in terms of 
foreign exchange. 
III. THE CIVIL WAR 
Sudan has had only 10 years of relative peace, from 1972-1983 since independence 
in 1956. Since 1983 the war between the North and the South has resumed. 
Colonel Garang leads the SPLA, the rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Army) in 
the South. However, last year Riek Mashar lead an attempted coup against Garang 
by other rebel military leaders. Mashar contested Garang's human rights 
record and his hopes for Sudan. Originally Mashar argued that the South should 
secede, while Garang aims for a united secular Sudan. However, tribal rivalry 
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seems to have become the overriding reason for the division, with Dinka people 
supporting Garang, and Nuer people supporting Machar. 
Garang has accused Machar of collaborating with the government. Whether or not 
this is so, it is clear that the SPLA divisions play into the government's 
hands. While the rebels formerly held 90% of the South, the government has now 
reconquered two-thirds since Dr. Machar broke away. However reunification of 
the SPLA is not a realistic possibility. 
Large scale torture, rape, abduction of wqmen and children, and arbitrary 
killings take place. Whole communi ties, not just troops of soldiers are 
destroyed. This appears to be a deliberate strategy, to breakdown the 
communities which might harbour opposition. Abuses are perpetrated by all 
sides. 
It is clear that the war is catastrophic for the population, not only in terms 
of direct violence. It is also devastating the economic and social structures, 
and has displaced almost three million people. 
Effects of war: 
displaced people: The ACP-EEC mission found that the war had "devastated" 
the south and displaced more than one-third of the population. The 
government increases the problems by destroying the camps established by 
displaced people, and moving them again. It appears their only motive is 
social control: to undermine social and economic roots of those 
communities, which may harbour and identify with the rebel movement. 
Well-established camps of displaced people exist around Khartoum. Water and 
food distribution systems, and basic schools, have been established with 
support from overseas and UN donors. Some of the men living in these camps 
worked in Khartoum. The regime carries out overnight relocation of large 
numbers of these people with no warning. They are moved to socially and 
economically isolated areas with no health services, water shelter, 
sanitation or transport facilities. "People are literally dropped in the 
desert" (Medicins sans Frontieres report March 24, 1992) 
Role of donors in treatment of displaced people: The government uses aid 
organisation's work in the camps of displaced people, and in providing 
services when the people are moved, to legitimise their policies. Donors 
are caught in double bind: should they continue to provide what services 
they can, and risk being so used; or should they refuse the risk of being 
instrumental in government actions, and leave the displaced people with no 
external witness to their plight and not even basic facilities. A Medicins 
Sans Frontieres delegation which visited Sudan this year concluded that 
donors should continue their involvement, while attempting to use their 
leverage with the government to establish minimal rights for displaced 
people. 
Increase in slaverv: Traditional slavery survives in modern-day Sudan, and war 
has provoked an increase, according to the International Labour Organisation 
(World Labour Report 1993). Reports to the United Nations Working Group on 
Slavery in 1988 alleged that the Government had provided arms to unofficial 
militia groups to enable them to raid Dinka villages - the intention being to 
depopulate the "border" region between the north and the south and remove 
potential support for the rebel SPLA. As payment for their activities the 
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militia were seizing various forms of booty, including goods, livestock - and 
slaves. Desperate parents are also known to have sold their children. 
IV. twMAN··· RIGHTS ABUSES 
.. . .. 
No democracy: The RCC (Revolutionary Command Council, the government) banned 
political parties in favour of "People's Congresses" which are supposed to be 
established after a "broad united front" has been achieved to resolve the war 
and the economic crisis. An unelected "Transitional National Assembly" of 
appointees was established on 24 February 1992. The government is an Islamic 
fundamentalist military dictatorship. It may not, however, be monolithic, and 
may still include a moderate faction who might be more responsive than El 
Bashir. 
No trade unions: Trade Unions cannot function under the present system. 
No press freedom: "There is no press freedom in the Sudan" (Report of ACP-EEC 
delegation 1991, p12). The EP Resolution (B3-0513/91, April 91) condemned press 
restrictions in Sudan. In 1990, 40 independent newspapers and journals existed. 
By April 1991, only 3 government sponsored newspapers were being printed. 
Journalists' travel must be approved by the authorities. Several editors 
(including Al-Midan, Tijani el Tayeb, al R' ay al AE1m and Mohamed Medani Tawfiq, 
all subject of the aforementioned EP resolution) were arrested without charge 
and confined. 
Human rights organisations: Many members of such organisations have been 
detained without fair (or any) trial, and tortured in 'ghost houses' (short term 
incarceration camps, where people are often held incommunicado). Organisations 
concerned with human rights such as the Sudan Bar Association, the Sudan Human 
Rights Organisation and the Sudan Amputees Organisation (for those amputated 
under the Sharia law), have been banned by the government. Some have been 
replaced by government run organisations with the same name, in an attempt to 
improve the government's image. 
Political imprisonment: Political imprisonment is the norm in Sudan. The 
former adviser to Sadiq El Mahdi, who spent several months in detention 
following the coup d'etat explained to the European Parliament mission, which 
visited in 1991, that anyone active in politics in the Sudan should expect to 
spend some of his political life as a political detainee. The RCC concurred! 
However on 30 April 1991 El Bashir responded to incernational criticism of his 
human rights record by announcing an amnesty for "all political prisoners". 300 
prisoners of conscience were freed, many of whom hal been detained \Iii thout trial 
or charge since shortly after the 30 June coup in 1989. However not all 
political prisoners and prisoners of conscience w~re freed. There have since 
been new arrests, and rearrests of some of those freed during the amnesty. At 
least 40 prisoners of conscience remain in prison (Amnesty International, 6 Dec 
91). An Amnesty report of April 1991 concludes: "The releases, while welcome, 
have done little to reduce the continuing gross violation of human rights by the 
Sudanese government." The report also found that in March 1992, at least 200 
suspected government opponents were in prison. 
Sudan's Sharia laws abuse human rights: The Sudan Bar Association, which was 
awarded the 1991 Human Rights Award by the American Bar Association, considers 
the Sharia contrary to fundamental human rights. Sharia abuses human rights 
because it discriminates against non-muslims and women, and because the content 
of Sharia punishments in themselves are incompatible with respect for human 
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rights. 
Sharia (Islamic) law was introduced in March, 1991. At present the Sharia is 
supposedly limited to the North of the country, although the draft penal code 
of 1988 envisaged the extension of Islamic law in the south. Already huddud 
penalties are being applied in government held garrison towns in the South, by 
local imans and militias. Alcohol is banned throughout the country. Forcible 
circumcision of both women and men by soldiers has also been reported in the 
South. 
Sharia discrimination aqainst non-muslims: Under Sharia non-Moslems' rights are 
restricted in the realms of politics, religion, employment, and the judicial 
system. 
Non-Muslirns have limited ~ights to testify in court. In the 1988 case of the 
Sudan Government versus Abu Nora, the judge interpreted the Laws of Evidence of 
1983 (whish are "'-till in force) to mean that the testimony of a non-Moslem 
against a Moslem was not acceptable in court. 
Traditionally, under Shari a, non-Moslems may not serve in high government 
office, the judiciary , or the military in any position in which they will have 
authority over a Moslem, and may not practice their religion except in a 
discreet manner. 
Sharia penal ties: The punishments themselves constitute an abuse of human 
rights. Hudud penalties, which include stoning, amputation, flogging and 
crucifixion (the public display of an offenders body on the gallows after death 
by hanging), may be considered "cruel, inhuman and degrading" and as such are 
prohibited by the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, inhuman or 
Degrading Punishments" which was ratified by Sudan on 4 June 1986. Sentences 
of amputation can be passed under the present government's interpretation of the 
Sharia law. Four amputations, including cross-limb amputation where the right 
hand and left foot are amputated, have been performed since May 1991 (Sudan 
Monitor, October 1991). 
Status of .. ·..:omen under Sharia: Under the Sharia penal code women are treated as 
legal minors. They have limited rights to give evidence before a court in a 
trial for a haddi crime (theft), no rights in the case of adultery, and for 
otner offenses their test1mony is considered to be worth half that of a man. 
Rape convictions are obviously incredibly difficult to secure. According to 
most fundamentalist interpretations of Islam, women should not be involved in 
government or the legal profession in positions where they may have authority 
over a man. The present Sudan government has previously made public statements 
which suggest the intention of conforming to these principles. For example, the 
government has prohibited women travelling unless they are accompanied by a 
mahram (close male relative). 
Female genital mutilation: Even before Sharia, Sudanese women were severely 
dise~powered. One of the manifestations of this is the extensive practice of 
female genital mutilation. In the Northern 2/3 of the country, over 90% of 
women are subjected to the mutilation. The operation is usually done to girls 
aged 5-7. It commonly results in haemorrhage, infections, septicaemia, 
retention of urine, and shock which can be fatal. (For discussion of damaging 
health effects of circumcision, see Verzin 1975, Cook 1976, Shandall 1967, 
Toubia 1985, and El Dareer 1982). 
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Women usually carry out the operation, and some of its strongest defenders are 
women. The present alternative to circumcision for many women is social 
ostracism and economic ruin. Circumcision can be a marker of ethnic identity 
and class status, and without it a woman (in the North) is treated as a s~ut. 
While most women are economically active, they depend on their position as wives 
and mothers for economic security and social status. Under Islamic law men 
inherit twice what women do. 
Colonial government's attempts to 
backlash where circumcision was 
Saadawi, an Egyptian doctor and 
The fight against female genital mutilation: 
curb the practice sometimes resulted in a 
associated with cultural pride. Nawal El 
novelist, commented on some Western attempts to help combat female circumcision: 
"That kind of help, which they think of as solidarity, is another type 
of colonialism in disguise. So we must deal with female circumcision 
ourselves. It is our culture, we understand it, when to fight against 
it and how, because this is the process of liberation" 
Nawal El Saadawi, 1980 
Determined efforts have been made to eliminate the practice. Sudan is the only 
country in Africa to have a record of legislating against it. Female 
circumcision is at present illegal in Sudan. Decades ago the Women's Union took 
a stand against circumcision. Courses about the negative physical and 
psychological effects have been taught in Khartoum Nursing college and in 
midwife training. However it is not decreasing. 
In February 1979 the Ahfad University College for Women, in co-operation with 
Community Leaders in Khartoum held a symposium on 'The Changing Status of 
Sudanese Women'. The symposium recommended, with regard to female circumcision: 
all female circumcision should be stopped 
a campaign including the use of mass media and curriculum programmes should 
be carried out to inform the public of the harmful effects of circumcision 
medical experts should convince religious leaders and policy makers of the 
dangers of circumcision 
traditional midwives who practise circumcision should be trained in other 
medical or health fields so as to enable them to earn a compensatory source 
of income 
The European Community should support these demands. 
The death penalty: Apostasy is punishable by death. Speaking out against 
Sudan's fundamentalist government could be interpreted as apostasy by Sudan's 
present judiciary. Amnesty reports that in september 1991, in the Western part 
of Sudan 8 people were sentenced to death by hanging followed by public 
crucifixion. They were convicted by tribunal (not a fair trial) on charges such 
as 'Highway Robbery', and 'Spreading corruption on earth' (can mean a political 
offense). On 6 Dec 91 six men were sentenced to death by hanging under Sharia, 
charged with murdering and robbing four people in Khartoum South. They were 
convicted on what the judge described as circumstantial evidence. Under Sharia, 
crimes such as murder and armed robbery are punishable by death. Ibrahim Dubara 
was hanged in public in El-Fashir, on 9 November 1991. In early August, 13 
other criminal prisoners were executed in Kober prison in Khartoum. 
The death penalty contravenes human rights, violating the right to life and the 
right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, as 
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proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Ethnic cleansing of the Nuba peoples: The Nuba peoples are a pocket of 
Christian and animist non-Arabs in the largely Muslim North. Africa Watch 
reports that the government appears to be implementing a campaign of virtual 
genocide against the Nuba: 
"The current campaign appears to be aimed at eradicating the traditional 
society and culture of the Nuba, and removing them from their ancestral 
lands. It includes the detention and killing of educated Nuba and young men 
suspected of sympathising with the SPLA; the burning of villages and, most 
sinister of all, the systematic relocation of the Nuba population away from 
their homeland to camps in adjoining northern Kordofan. These action, 
ranging far beyond what is required to combat the SPLA, are described as a 
"jihad" by the government. The relocation plan envisages separating men and 
women: the men will be sent to labour camps for large commercial farms, and 
the women and children to work as domestic servants in northern Arab 
households. By these means, traditional Nuba culture and society will 
become obliterated." 
Juba: Sudanese government forces last year deliberately killed "at least 300 
unarmed civilians and prisoners" in Juba (Amnesty International). The report 
on the atrocities due from the Special Commission of Inquiry has not yet 
materialised. 
V. FOREIGN RELATIONS 
Foreign involvement in the civil war: The press reports imports of mustard gas 
from Iraq, 1991, and arms from Iran and China. Rafsanjani, Iranian head of 
state, visited Sudan in December 1991, and during the visit promised US$17 
million in aid, to pay China to provide weapons for Sudan, to give one million 
tons-of free oil each year and provide weapons. The imposition of strict Sharia 
laws may be connected with Iranian influence. 
In August the US placed Sudan on its official list of countries sponsoring 
terrorism, although US officials acknowledge that they have no evidence that 
Sudan has conducted or sponsored specific terrorist acts. 
Responsiveness to foreign pressure: There are indications that Sudan is not 
totally unresponsive to foreign pressure. After the EC-ACP mission to Sudan in 
December 1990, 300 political prisoners were released. The Pope's recent visit 
to Khartoum was apparently followed by a decrease in harassment of Catholics. 
MSF staff have emphasised the importance of continued aid, in spite of potential 
manipulation by all sides in the war. 
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vi. FORMER Et?::AcTtotroN.::·sool\N 
. ·, . . . ..· .. · 
In December 1990 ACP-EEC delegation sent a Mission of Information to Sudan. 
Resolutions 
1. June 1990 the European Parliament made the exceptional decision to call for 
suspension of all programmable aid to Sudan, while asking for an increase 
in humanitarian assistance to people of Sudan through international aid 
organisations and NGOs. 
2. Dr. Mamoun M. Hussein was the subject of a resolution and appeal by the EP 
for clemency. He was subsequently pardoned by President El Bashir from a 
death sentence for leading a strike. He was freed and met the EP mission 
to Sudan in Dec 1990. 
3. Motion for a resolution on imprisonment of 9 writers in Sudan. Calls for 
their release and for the government to permit independent newspapers to 
reopen. 
4. 10.6.91, by Bindi and Verhagen, on behalf of the PPE group (83-0991/91). 
Motion for a Resolution on behalf of the PPE group on Ethiopia and Sudan. 
Condemns Sudanese government for attacks on th2 civilian population and aid 
workers. 
5. 9.4.92, Resolution 83-0489, 0494, 0518, 0545, 0557, 0559, 0570, and 0575/92. 
on famine in Africa and Sudan. 
6. A formal proposal for condemnation of Sudan's policy of oppression and 
genocide was introduced on 20 October, 1992, and six MEPs, Tindemans, 
Cassanmagnago, Mottola, Verhagen, Robles Piquer, and Mantovani, met with 
Bishop Macram Max Gassis of El-Obeid on 4 November to discuss the various 
problems facing Sudan. 
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B3-0217/91 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
by Mr STAES 
on the human rights situation and the war in Sudan 
The Eurooea:1 Parliament, 
A. whereas the fighting between the military government and the armed 
opposition in Sudan has plunged the south of the country into a spiral of 
violence, _ 
B. whereas the civilian ?Opulation is the main victim of this state of 
affairs, 
C. alarmed at reports in :he Egyptian and British press that the Government 
of Sudan has secretly imported five tonnes of chemical weapons (mustard 
gas) from Iraq, 
D. alarmed at reports that the Sudanese army has attacked aid convoys sent by 
humanitarian organizations, 
1. Condemns all human rights violations in Sudan; 
2. Calls on all political groupings to refrain from acts of violence and to 
take part in negotiations; 
3. Calls on the Sudanese authorities to refrain from using chemical weapons 
against either the armed opposition or the civilian population; 
4. Calls on the Sudanese authorities to allow foreign humanitarian 
organizations to continue their humanitarian work in the field; 
5. Calls on the Sudanese authorities to ensure that the police and the army 
abide by the law, in the south of the country as elsewhere, and that those 
guilty of human rights violations are punished; 
6. Instructs its President to intercede with the Government of Sudan to that 
effect. 
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OPINION 
(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Development and Cooperation 
for the Committee on Political Affairs and Security 
Draftsman: Mr Niall ANDREWS 
At its meeting of 20 December 1991 , the Committee on Development and 
Cooperation appointed Mr ANDREWS, draftsman. 
At its meetings of 21 May and 14 July 1992, it considered the draft 
opinion. 
At its meeting of 23 September 1993, it adopted the conclusions as a whole 
unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr Saby, chairman; Mr Chiabrando, 
vice-chairman;, Mr Andrews, draftsman; Mrs Daly, Mr Escuder Croft (deputising 
for Mrs Bindi), Mr Kostopoulos, Mr Langer (deputising for Mr Telkamper), Mr 
Mantovani, Mr McGowan, Mrs van Putten, Mrs Schmidbauer, Mrs Simons, Mr Vecchi, 
Mr Verhagen and Mr Wynn. 
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Introduction 
In the last four years the situation in Sudan has evolved in such a 
dramatic way that it is time to take stock of what is happening and to debate 
seriously the sort of relationship that the European Community wishes to pursue 
with what remains one of the poorest countries of the world. 
The vulnerability of the majority of the Sudanese population not only to 
the impact of drought and environmental changes, but also to the debilitating 
effects of a prolonged civil war is exacerbated further by severe restrictions 
on individual and collective freedoms which the authorities in Khartoum have 
imposed progressively since the coup d'etat of June 1989. 
The dilemma for the European Community, for its Member States and the for 
the broader international community lies in its apparent difficulty of 
establishing the ways and means of providing support to the beleaguered when the 
authorities are often reluctant to make a request for assistance; while at the 
same time criticising the authorities, even though they are impervious to such 
criticism. 
The European Community and its Member States find themselves in a situation 
where they continue to provide humanitarian aid in order to alleviate human 
suffering as far as possible, which is highly commendable. However the 
Community has failed to take any real political initiative whatsoever and has 
failed to act firmly enough to prevent prolonged conflict or to encourage 
democratic reforms and freedoms within the Sudan. The series of political 
declarations of intent made by the Council do not appear to have been followed 
up with political actions. 
The sovereignty of Sudan has been sadly undermined by the intra-national 
conflict opposing the minority forces of the South - in particular the SPLA/SPLM 
against the governmental forces of Khartoum. The international community, 
respectful of international law, naturally continues to view Sudan as a 
sovereign state, even though it is willing to engage in cross-border relief 
operations. 
Religion and religious belief have always been a key element in Sudanese 
politics. Colonialisation distilled animistic, christian and muslim beliefs 
within boundaries which were artificial. Sudan is not alone in that respect for 
the 1888 Conference of Berlin left its mark all over Africa. Yet, today, Sudan 
is the only country in Africa where religious identification has caused such 
prolonged suffering and misery. Attempts to overcome religious sectarianism in 
the post-Nimeiri period during th~ short-lived democratic regime of Sadiq al 
Mahdi, itself undermined by factious disputes, failed as Islamic fundamentalism 
gained the upper hand. 
The Sudanese society, characterised by the mixed influences of Arab and 
African cultures, was always renowned (in the modern period at least) for its 
tolerance and respect for humanity. Never before have the Sudanese people 
experienced the sorts of violations of human rights from which they are 
currently suffering. 
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International relations have now reached a stage where the respect for 
human rights has become a touchstone which determines broader political actions. 
Thus, countries which are seen to condone systematic human rights violations are 
becoming increasingly ostracised by the world community. Such is the case of 
Sudan. 
The system of power 
Following the coup d I etat and the establishment of the Revolutionary 
Command Council of National Salvation, all political parties, trade unions and 
other organised bodies of opinion were banned with the notable exception of the 
National Islamic Front (NIF), which provides the hard core of the country's 
leadership. Press freedom was abolished. 
Although in the early period of rule of Lt. General Orner Hassan Ahmed 
El Beshir the government was by no means monolithic in character, as time has 
passed those with alternative views have gradually been expelled. From the 
beginning the NIF, directed by Hassan Abdalla El Turabi, nevertheless occupied 
all the key strategic positions. No political decision of any significance was 
able to be taken, even by General El Beshir himself, without it having been 
first approved by an 'inner council' whose membership was drawn entirely from 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood. As time has gone by, El Turabi and his close 
associates are becoming more clearly identified as the nucleus of political 
authority and power in the country. 
An example of governmental sackings is the case of Peter Orat, responsible 
Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation, who was working to the best of his 
abilities to administer the country's humanitarian aid programmes directed at 
refugees and displaced persons. His efforts were considerable and coming from 
Malakal, a few hundred kilometers south of Khartoum, he had first hand 
experience of the hardship faced by an enormous number of his fellow countrymen. 
He also did much to improve the relationship between NGOs working in Sudan and 
the authorities, yet this was not appreciated by the authorities, and he was 
sacked shortly after the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly mission visited Sudan in 
December 1990. His responsibilities were transferred to the Minister of 
Commerce and Trade, and since then no new Minister f:)r Relief and Re~abili tat ion 
has been appointed. 
Following the coup of June 1989, the National Islamic Front leadership 
immediately set about replacing several thousand of the country's senior civil 
servants, diplomats and other officials, incluc.lng judyes, by their own 
nominees. The army leadership was purged and many senior military officers were 
subsequently executed in April 1990. Their execuyions, numbering 34 at this 
time, followed a supposed attempted coup d'etat for which proof was never 
furnished. At the same time the security forces .•ere re-organised and muslim 
militia groups established throughout the country. With the objective of 
creating a force of 150.000, these militia groups were frequently trained by 
Iranian personnel, and Iran also paid for arms and equipment, much of it from 
China. (In fact, since 1985, Islamic militia gro'JPS had been formed, notably 
the Murahaleen, which pursued the war in the south with support from certain 
sectors of the army before the 1989 coup). 
While this was taking place a National Dialog•Je Conference was created in 
order to make recommendations concerning the nation's future institutions. The 
proposals made by the conference favoured the establishment of a system of 
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people's congresses. They also favoured the establishment of Islamic law and 
the application of the Sharia. In February 1992, a new parliament, the 
Transitional National Assemoly, met for the first time. Its membership is 
composed of 300 persons appointed by the authorities. The Transitional 
National Assembly was not me;-"tioned in the final report of the National Dialogue 
Conference on the Political System, which had been set up by General El Beshir 
and organised by Colonel Motamed Al Amin Khalifa in order to make proposals for 
new constitutional and inst·itutional structures for the country. Significantly, 
Colonel Khalifa, having bee1 "dismissed" from the government shortly before, 
became the first President of the Transitional National Assembly. Given Colonel 
Khalifa 's previous ::-esponsiLili ties in external affairs, it is likely that he 
will use his new office to try to add a foreign affairs component to the 
Transitiona 1 National Assemtly's role. 
Origin<-~lly a r:ational congress was to be instituted which would elect 
members of tne state council. The fact that none of this has happened and that 
the regime has had to fall b~ck on an appointed Transitional National Assembly, 
ind1cates that cons1derable difficulties are being experienced by the government 
in gaining anything like popular support. 
All regional governors were replaced by NIF nominees. Since February 1992 
the regions have been replaced by states, of which there are nine including 
three in the south. In the south the deputy-governors appear to have more 
authority than the governors who are noticeably non-muslim and seen as figure-
heads. 66 provinces are established and 281 local government areas or 
districts. In spite of such measures, control is still exercised from the 
centre. 
The application of the Sharia linked to the emergency laws dating from 
before the coup have provided a legal framework for the country which appears 
in many cases to be arbitrary. 124 judges were replaced following the coup 
d'etat and 60 more resigned in protest at the Islamisation of the legal system. 
At local level, local village tribunals (Nizaam El Ham) operate alongside public 
order tribunals. Sharia sentences are executed swiftly though appeals are 
allowed to the Appeal Court in some cases. The Appeal Court judge is usually 
a muslim nominee from the governor following authorisation from the Minister of 
Just1ce in Khartoum. In February 1992, Mr Abdel-Sami Omar Ahmad became Minister 
of Justice and Attorney-General. An influential "adviser" to the government's 
inner circle, he also represented Sudan on occasion, at meetings of the ACP-EEC 
Joint Assembly. 
Economic affairs have been more or less detached from Islamic political 
considerations, as the government pursues radical reforms aimed at liberalising 
the economy according to IMF requirements. Within the banking centre however, 
the Agricultural Bank of Sudan has lost out to the Islamic banks of the capital. 
Economic growth should increase in 1992 with cotton, the country's main export, 
increasing its share of trade. Inflation remains a problem and is forecast to 
exceed 200% in 1992. 
Diplomatic relations 
The government of Sudan has few allies in the international community and 
finds itself isolated by most Arab states. Its closest foreign relations are 
established with Iran, Iraq and, to a certain extent, Libya which provides much 
of the nation's oil imports. General Ghadafi is known to mistrust Islamic 
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fundamentalism, which confuses the Islamic religion with state institutions. 
The Muslim Brotherhood is increasingly using Sudan as a base for its 
international operations in Africa, and one can note the attempts being made to 
strengthen the Muslim Brotherhood in such countries as Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, 
Senegal as well as Jordan in the Middle East. 
The Sudanese government and its Foreign Minister, Ali Sahlool, have 
nevertheless pursued their efforts to normalise relations with neighbouring 
states. The new Ethiopian regime has collaborated with the Sudanese army during 
the dry season offensive when they captured Pachala in the south of Sudan and 
allowed Sudanese military personnel to operate on Ethiopian territory6 • A non-
aggression understanding has been discussed with Kenya and relations are said 
to be improving with Uganda and Zaire. 
Relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia are increasingly strained and other 
Arab states remain mistrustful of Sudanese intentions, as they fear the 
activities of the fundamentalists. Events in Algeria have served as a clear 
warning to many countries with muslim populations. Increasing efforts are made 
by these countries to stress the need for the respect for religious beliefs as 
well as the need to separate religion from constitutional politics. 
Diplomatic relations with the United States and other industrialised 
countries were further complicated when the Sudanese government supported Saddam 
Hussein in the Gulf conflict. Accusations were made that the Sudan had trained 
scud missiles on Saudi Arabia at Iraq's behest, though no proof was ever 
provided. However given the prolonged period of tension which has yet to 
subside, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, it is unlikely that relations between 
the Sudan and the United States will improve. The Sudanese government has also 
been critical of the Middle East Peace Conference in contrast to most other Arab 
countries. Both the U.S. Senate and Administration echo the European Community 
criticisms of human rights abuses in the Sudan and the U.S. has gone further 
than the Community in drastically reducing its development aid and food aid 
programmes and personnel. U.S. Aid has reduced its staff from 54 to 4 in 
Khartoum. 
European Community Member States have also reduced staff levels in the 
Sudanese capital and Denmark and Spain have closed their embassies in protest 
at human rights violations, while The Netherlands has blocked its 1992 bilateral 
aid programme. 
The European Commission Delegation in Khartoum has had one official 
expelled by the Sudanese authorities. This official was responsible for 
humanitarian aid projects and relations with the NGOs. 
The war in the south 
6Pachala was very lightly defended by SPLM soldiers. Most of its 
inhabitants and nearly all of those killed were former refugees 
who had been forced to flee refugee camps in the Gambella province 
of Ethiopia by the new Ethiopian regime. 
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In fact the civil war which has been going on for a decade has spread 
beyond the south and into Khordofan and southern Darfour. It is estimated that 
military expenditure accounts for 60% of the government budget. Hundreds of 
thousands of people have been displaced by the conflict and at present there 
appears to be no prospect of reconciliation between the government and the 
SPLA/SPLM. The nature of the existing regime in Khartoum remains anathema to 
the SPLA which seeks to establish a multiparty democracy with respect for human 
rights. It is not always the case that SPLA methods themselves conform with its 
professed objectives, as the SPLA has also been strongly criticised for human 
rights violations. 
There are signs that the government would do a deal with the SPLA if the 
conditions for a ceasefire could be established. Yet in spite of unilateral 
commitments by the SPLA, no negotiations have been able to be concluded. The 
February 1992 government offensive put paid to hopes of the cessation of 
hostilities. The government is still unwilling to engage itself in a roundtable 
discussion with all opposition parties with a view to bringing about peace. 
Since June 1989, three distinct peace initiatives have been undertaken. 
In November 1989, the government published a document entitled "The Government's 
Peace Programme for Negotiations with the SPLA/SPLM", which was presented by 
Colonel Mohamed Al Amin Khalifa, Chairman of the National Dialogue Conference 
on Peace Issues. The document is very detailed in its proposals on federalism 
and on cultural diversity. The state and religion is also covered, yet much of 
what is written is at variance with the practice of the government of Sudan. 
Talks were held between both sides in late 1991 in Addis Ababa and in Nairobi 
before they eventually broke down. 
The second initiative was made by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
in conjunction with the Nigerian government. Although the government publicly 
welcomed the OAU's efforts, once again it failed to make the practical steps 
necessary to achieve any progress. The SPLA also found itself in difficulty and 
having to cope with internal divisions before any talks got underway. (See 
below) 
The third attempt at peace was undertaken by the United States' Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr Herman Cohen. Colonel Pio Yukwan 
Deng, Minister responsible for the South, welcomed the initiative which has 
nevertheless remained a dead letter. Since then Washington has declared that 
it would still be prepared to mediate in any settlement if both sides were 
prepared to make concessions. 
In Equatoria, Bahr El Ghazal, Jonglei and in the areas to the north, 
fighting has continued. The split within the SPLA of last September led to 
vicious internacene fighting and the marginalisation of the leaders of the 
revolt against the SPLA, Riek Machar and Lam Akol, but not before several 
battles had been fought between the Dinka supporters of the SPLA and the Nuer 
supporters of the dissident faction. The government-backed Anya Any a Two 
militia sided with the dissidents to increase havoc and commit attrocities in 
the town of Bor. John Garang, the SPLA leader, is now said to have restored the 
unity of the SPLA enough to have repulsed the government's offensive in April 
1992. The dry season offensive by the government appears to be at an end and 
its troops are apparently demoralised. Nevertheless, they may legitimately 
claim a series of military victories and several former SPLA strongholds have 
fallen. 
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Possibly as a result of the spring military campaign, the OAU peace 
initiative was ressurected and negotiations were held in Ahuja, Nigeria from May 
26th to June 4th 1992 under the good offices of President Ibrahim BABANGIDA. 
(The European Council of Ministers, meeting in the framework of European 
Political Cooperation, on 18th May 1992 lent their support to the peace 
ini tia ti ve. ) No ceasef ire was agreed, yet there was recognition of the 
widespread disruption caused by the war and the need to embark upon the process 
of reconstruction. References were made to an interim administration without 
any details being agreed. The Delegation of the Government was led by Mohammed 
El-Amin Khalifa and the Delegation of the SPLA was led by 
William Nyoun Bany. Further meetings are envisaged. 
The civil war has probably claimed more than 600.000 lives and completely 
disrupted and destroyed what is potentially one of the more economically viable 
parts of the country. It has also exacerbated a severe drought problem in the 
region and undermined all efforts at obtaining food security. 
Opposition to the government in Khartoum is constituted not only by the 
SPLA but also by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The NDA is formed of 
several parties including the Umma party and the Democratic Unionist Party. 
It is a fairly heterogeneous group and most of its leadership is constrained to 
live in exile in Egypt and England. It has produced many blueprints for a new 
multi-party democracy for Sudan, yet it remains div:..ded, cr.Ltically, between the 
secular parties including the SPLA and the two religious parties mentioned above 
who retained their support for the Sharia. 
The weakness of the opposition coalition forces does not necessarily mean 
that they would be unable to form an alternative government within a federal 
structure, respecting democratic freedoms and human rights. Indeed if the 
country is to avoid being split completely in two, they constitute the only 
alternative to the existing regime unless the army intervenes. The latter 
option becomes less likely as time goes by as the frequent purges are designed 
to weaken the organisational capacity of the military hierarchy and most non-
muslim military leaders have already been removed. 
The no-win situation for the government and the SPLA/SPLM in the intra-
national conflict, by attrition, may gradually encourage the secessicnist 
tendencies in the government and the opposition. 
Problems of food security and humanitarian assistctnce 
In the areas affected by the war, malnutrH ion is ::.he norrr.. Even the 
attempts to organise cross border aid convoys prove to be extremely hazardous 
and air-dropped supplies are frequently inadequat~ given :he enormous expanse 
of territory which needs to be covered. The warring armies have not hesitated 
in the past to shoot at aid convoys travelling b1 river, by road and by air. 
Even when humanitarian corridors are negotiated, the delivery of urgent medical 
and food supplies may not last very long - rarely as long as was intended. 
Scarcity of food and medical supplies in the south, s~uth-west and south-
east of the country is such that even when people do not die from hunger, they 
remain physically and often mentally diminished for the rest of their lives. 
Life expectancy in this area is the lowest in Afrlca. 
Faced with such a situation, western donors, international aid agencies, 
and non-governmental organisations have for years been working to prevent the 
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worst from happening with only limited success in spite of enormous efforts. 
Sudanese authorities have failed to ensure effective coordination of aid efforts 
and they have been unwilling, except under pressure, to appreciate the 
contribution that can be made by NGOs in particular. Obstacles have often been 
placed in the path of aid agencies. 
This is not tu say thJt the Sudanese government has made no effort to 
improve national food production and agricultural development. New irrigation 
schemes have increased sorgh.1m and wheat production. However the government has 
too often recused international relief efforts as being unnecessary when this 
was clearly not the :::ase. TJ-.e subsequent delay in the implementation of certain 
operations only added to hardships in 1991. FAO and WFP crop assessments on 
which food .:1id predictions: . ,re based, are again only belately accepted by the 
government and its agencies. Public requests for international solidarity are 
considered by the governme!1t of Sudan to be demeaning. The FAO/WFP crop 
assessment for 1992 while indicating an increase in food production overall, 
forecasts a 900.000 tonne food deficit in the subsistence areas of southern 
Sudan, Darfour, the Red Sea Hills and Khordofan. By December 1991, the European 
Commission had already received requests from NGOs for 177.000 tonnes of food 
aid. Accoroing to Lhe Comrn~ssion in its Communication of April 2nd 1992 on a 
Special Food Aid Programme for Africa, Sudan had requirements amounting to 
480.000 tonnes of cereals, 133.000 tonnes of other food aid and 59.000 tonnes 
of vegetable oil. The Community's response so far has been to programme 82.600 
tonnes of cereals, 5.600 tonnes of other food aid and 2.000 tonnes of seed. 
Member States have programmed 45.000 tonnes of cereals and 4.200 tonnes of other 
food products. The shortfall is still considerable. The government continues 
to export food and has been uncooperative in food swap arrangements. 
Because of the war, in March the government suspended permission for both 
the United Nations and International Red Cross flights from Kenya and the Head 
of the UN Relief Programme, Thomas Ekvall, strongly criticised this decision. 
Since then a few flights have resumed. Those who operate such flights work in 
permanent danger. In September 1991, the Red Cross Hercules C-130 transport 
plane was destroyed by a mine on an air strip in Wau. The French NGO Medecin 
sans Frontiere lost two of its staff when a clearly marked plane was shot down. 
Refugees and displaced persons 
Sudan has a population of approximately 22 million people. Refugees have 
constituted at times almost 10% of the population. Most of these came from 
Ethiopia in the east, but also from Uganda and from Tchad. The European 
Parliament has participated in several missions which have investigated this 
situation at various periods. 
The European Community and its Member States have not only been the major 
source of humanitarian aid for refugees in Sudan, particularly through the Lome 
Convention and the Community food aid commitments, they have also been 
initiators of new refugee policy in conjunction with the UNHCR and with many 
NGOs such as CONCERN, OXFAM, Save the Children Fund, CARITAS and others. During 
the severe Ethiopian famines of the 1980s hundreds of thousands of people fled 
into the safe haven of Gedaref and other places in eastern Sudan. Many of these 
were euphemistically called spontaneous refugees, settling in local communities, 
though never officially registered. Obviously, the impact of such a large 
influx of people placed great strain on local communities in many ways. 
Now, in spite of the fact that repatriation programmes are in preparation 
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for many Eri trean/Ethiopian refugees, their hypothetical move is likely to 
spread over several years and there is still special and urgent need for the 
care and maintenance programme to be maintained. It would be completely wrong 
of the European Community to withdraw financial support for this programme at 
this crucial stage. Until now the Community has financed this to the tune of 
30 mECU and refugee-affected areas must continue to be supported. The Community 
should also engage itself in the discussion on the repatriation projects for 
which Lome funds could be used. In any event such projects as these must be 
dissociated from any political sanctions that the Community might operate in 
relation to the Sudanese authorities as they are clearly humanitarian in nature. 
The plight of several million displaced persons has always been 
particularly tragic as they do not enjoy the particular status afforded to 
refugees, nor can they count on international protection. Over 2 million 
people, having fled the war in the south, were housed in often appaling 
conditions in large sprawling camps around the capital. They were subject, not 
only to the frequent interruption of water supplies (as were many of Khartoum's 
indigenous population), but also from neglect by the government and by NGOs. 
In spite of this, families managed to exist under extremely arduous conditions. 
Following severe flooding in 1990, the government proceeded to move the 
occupants of Hellat Shaak camp by force, and without warning, to Jebel Aulia 
camp situated some 50 kilometres south of Khartoum. Rudementary preparations 
had been made in Jebel Aulia to receive the displaced persons although nothing 
like as much as would have been reasonably required. In some ways, compared to 
the disease-ridden rubbish tip that was Hellat Shaak, Jebel Aulia was an 
improvement and close by agricultural land was available. But, the violent way 
in which people were loaded on to lorries and dumped at a place which seemed to 
them to be in the middle of the desert was justly criticised by the 
international community. If a rationale existed for such a move, it was 
certainly hidden well behind the facts of the situation. 
In spite of attempts by UNICEF, the Sudanese Council of Churches, and one 
or two other relief organisations, other camps around Khartoum and Omdurman, for 
example, Zagalona and Kousha camps, were only slightly better that Hellat Shaak 
had been. Inevitably, consideration needed to be given to finding alternative 
and available land while maintaining access to water, fuel and where possible, 
work . In any event, by no stretch of the imagination, can these camps have 
been intended as a permanent home for their occupants. At best they constitute, 
and they constituted, shelter from the storm of civil war, famine and drought. 
From January 1992 the army, the militia and police moved into the camps and 
violently ejected tens of thousands of men, women and children. What little 
infrastructure the camps possessed was destroyed and burnt. In separate 
incidents more than 30 people were killed during the move. In Kober too, more 
were expelled towards the south. 
This latest move appeared to be more of a deliberate attack which some have 
qualified as deliberately racist, which aimed to force the displaced back to 
where they came from. Some of the displaced may find their way to the refugee 
populated areas of eastern Sudan. 
A relatively new displaced persons settlement called Dar-es-Salaam/Kurmuta 
was destroyed by government troops and most of the pumping equipment was 
destroyed. This had been provided by UNICEF and they are claiming compensation. 
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Given the often atrocious conditions in displaced persons camps around 
Khartoum, it is understandable that more amenable locations be sought. What 
cannot be admitted however is the frequently violent methods used to evict 
displaced persons from established camps and their expulsion to new, and for 
them, unknown settlement areas which have not been properly prepared in terms 
of water or sanitation. For relocation policy to operate successfully, more 
resources must be found. The international community could contribute more in 
this way. At the same time, the government must endeavour to act more openly 
and discuss with the displaced persons' representatives the timetable and 
logistical matters related to their transfer to alternative settlements. 
Human rights 
If one were to judge the human rights situation in Sudan, purely on the 
basis of the written communications between the Sudanese authorities and the 
European Parliament or the Joint Assembly, then one would gain the impression 
that no problem existed, that no violence or ill-treatment ever occurred or was 
perpetrated by the security forces, that governmet detention centres or 'ghost 
houses' were a figment of one's imagination and that those who made statements 
having been tortured, and having witnessed the torture of others were mere 
provocators. 
In his letter to President Baron of October 13th 1990, President El Beshir 
assured the European Parliament that his country's observance of basic human 
rights was unwavering. Yet no independent judicial enquiry into allegations of 
torture and ill-treatment, as requested by the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly, has been 
authorised. 
The head of 'revolutionary security' Commander Ibrahim Chamseddine, member 
of the NIF leadership, who has overall charge of the 'ghost houses' and 
detention centres, has never acted against any member of the security services, 
accused of torture and ill-treatment. Silence is consent in such circumstances. 
The NIF leadership must be held responsible insofar as no other alternative 
responsibility exists. The former Minister of the Interior, Faysal Ali Abu 
Salik, refused all attempts to bring security agents to justice. The new 
Minister, Zubair Mohamed Saleh, who is also Deputy Prime Minister, pursues the 
same policy. They clearly, therefore, act with impunity and are a law unto 
themselves. 
Following the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly mission in December 1990, President 
El Beshir promised a positive response to the delegation's appeal for the 
release of political detainees. Of those visited by the delegation in Kober 
Prison, many were subsequently released in April 1991, some slightly before. 
However, not all those named by the government in its Communication of January 
23rd , 1991 were in fact released. Several were re-arrested later. 
Since then, the government has apparently demolished most of Kober Prison 
which was too much of a focal point of criticism. Prisons in El Fasher, Shalla, 
El-Duwaim, El Obeid, Suakin and elsewhere still house detainees, and many more 
are kept in the infamous and anonymous 'ghost houses' in Khartoum, Omdurman and 
other major cities in Sudan. 
The government of Sudan has acted with clemency in relation to a number of 
death sentences passed for political acts, by commuting them. Some prisoners 
were condemned to death, and subsequently released following appeals - such was 
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the case of Dr Mamoun M. Hussein, who the Joint Assembly delegation was later 
able to visit in his doctor's surgery in Khartoum. 
Since the release of a large number of political detainees a year ago, 
government policy has tended to concentrate more on short-term detention in 
'ghost houses'. Many observers, including Amnesty International and Africa 
Watch, believe that the non-muslim population is becoming under increasing 
pressure and intimidation. (This coincides with the contents of a note passed 
to one of the members of the Joint Assembly delegation when in Khartoum). 
The army and militia groups have concentrated repressive attacks on the 
Nuba peoples. Amnesty International considers the Nuba people to be victims of 
Sudanese government policies "designed to destroy them as a people", in other 
words, victims of genocide. 
(The latest Amnesty International Report of April 1992 gives names and details 
of many individual victims of human rights violations) 
The European Community policy towards Sudan, 
The European Community has in the past been the main development partner 
in the Sudan. Both through Lome support and direct Community financing for food 
aid and other humanitarian assistance, the European Community and the Sudan 
enjoyed close and harmonious relations until the coup d'etat of June 1989. 
The strengthening of the human rights provisions of the Fourth Lome 
Convention and the evolution of a more coherent Community policy on human rights 
has coincided with a worsening of the situation in Sudan. These factors have 
combined and justified an embargo on Lome IV programming dialogue between the 
Commission and the Sudanese authorities. In addition, in order to exert 
further pressure on the regime, agreement for the transfer of funds to Sudan 
under the Stabex scheme has been frozen. 31.7 million ECU await an improvement 
in human rights in the country. 
The use of outstanding funds for Lome II and Lome III is also compromised 
and several programmes previously entered into by the Community have been halted 
because of security problems. 
The relationship between the Community and the Sudan has not been helped 
by the Sudanese authorities, who have freqently mis-represented the position of 
the many donors who are providing humanitarian aid to Sudan. The forced 
relocation of displaced persons, mentioned above, goes against all the advice 
offered by the European Community. 
In spite of all this the Community continues with its efforts to provide 
humanitarian aid, assisted directly by non-govern .. 1ental o.:ganisations and the 
various international and U.N. agencies, which are specialised in the field. 
The Community considers that whatever political di:·agreemef'.tS exist between the 
Sudanese authorities and the Community and its Member States, the population of 
Sudan should not be made to suffer additional har1ship. Notwithstanding this 
principle, enormous logistical problems result from the lack of proper 
coordination and understanding between the donors and the local and national 
authorities. Undertakings given to provide safe passage for humanitarian 
convoys have frequently been broken both by government and militia forces as 
well as by the SPLA. 
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Political relations with the Sudan are therefore very strained and many 
have voiced the opinion that diplomatic relations should be broken. Were this 
to happen an extremely dangerous precedent would have been created amongst the 
Member States of the Lome Convention. It would also probably force the Sudanese 
government 1nto even more extreme positions, creating a very unpredictable 
environment in the region as a whole. 
It would be more constructive to try to maintain dialogue with the Sudanese 
authorities. The Jcint Asse.1bly and the European Parliament has endeavoured to 
do this as far as the responsibilities of these institutions are concerned. The 
hope remains that the relat· ionship of Europe with the people of Sudan will 
transcend any political dispute or disagreement with the existing government of 
the country. 
Conclusions 
The Development Committne considers the following points to be particularly 
important in relation to Community policy with Sudan: 
1. Considers that t:he main obstacle to the restoration of harmonious relations 
between the European Community and its Member States with Sudan is the 
persistent and frequent violation of human rights. Even though many 
political prisoners and detainees have been released by the Sudanese 
authorities, a correspondingly greater use has been made of short-term 
measures of detention in 'ghost houses' and other detention centres where 
torture and other forms of ill-treatment are perpetrated by internal 
security forces. Until this practice is stopped, political relations with 
the Sudan will necessarily remain strained and full resumption of 
cooperation between the EEC and Sudan will not be possible; 
2. Considers that the European Community and its Member States which have 
maintained their diplomatic representations in the Sudan should continue 
to pursue a critical but, as far as possible, constructive relationship 
with the political authorities; 
3. Remains pre-occupied bv the seriousness of the situation resulting from 
years of conflict in the South and by successive years of famine and food 
shortages. Believes that the attitude of the authorities in Sudan who 
appear to fail to recognise the gravity of the ~ituation ~~~lation to 
food security, creates long delays in the establi.s}:lment--of the necessary 
infrastructure which is required to deal with this problem; 
4. Fully supports the Community's special emergency food aid and medical 
assistance programme for the Sudan which is coordinated with the United 
Nations' second aid plan (SEPHA II). Believes nevertheless, that the 
quantities agreed may prove to be inadequate particularly if the war 
continues. In the light of this, expresses its amazement at reports that 
the Sudanese authorities have been selling cereals produced within Sudan 
to neighbouring countries in order to earn foreign exchange for arms 
purchases, and further believes that such practices considerably undermine 
the willingness of donor countries to provide continued support for the 
Sudanese population; 
v. While not seeking to question the individual beliefs and religious 
practices which exist in the Sudan, considers that greater tolerance should 
be manifested particularly by religious leaders. Expresses particular 
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concern that the Sharia is extensively used against non-muslim Sudanese, 
especially women, and that this exacerbates tensions within Sudanese 
society. Urges the government of Sudan to fully recognise the rights of 
other non-muslim religious denominations and their freedom of speech and 
association; 
6. Encourages efforts for peace between the SPLA and the Sudanese government 
and urges an immediate cease fire to be negotiated and welcomes the 
continued efforts of the O.A.U. to achieve a resolution of the conflict. 
Believes that the European Parliament or the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly could 
be called upon to assist in the peace process. Believes also that 
negotiations between the SPLA and the government alone will not resolve the 
political problems experienced by Sudan and that therefore other political 
forces should be associated with the peace process; 
7. Condemns the attacks perpetrated against refugees and populations fleeing 
the war in the South which were conducted by the forces under the authority 
of the government of Sudan; 
8. Remains deeply critical of the forced evacuation of displaced persons from 
their camps around Khartoum and Omdurman which led to great distress and 
further suffering for people already traumatised by deprivation and war. 
Considers that greater priority should be given to assisting these 
displaced persons by the international donor community and non-governmental 
organisations; 
9. Expresses deep concern at reports that the Sudanese authorities are 
increasingly moving towards a policy of excluding NGOs that are not 
prepared from the outset to given priority to Islamic sections of the 
population in distributing aid; 
10. Having been informed that Makoi Wuol Manuer, head of the Sudanese Council 
of Churches' resettlement programme, was detained in Khartoum on 9 February 
1992 and is at present probably being held in solitary confinement, calls 
on the President of the Islamic Republic of Sudan to order the immediate 
release of Makoi Wuol Manuer unless he is charged with a crime specified 
in the penal code and is given a fair trial without delay; 
11. Reiterates its call for sustained assistance to be provided for the large 
refugee populations currently living in different parts of Sudan; 
12. Commends the work of the staff of the Commission Delegation in Khartoum who 
have had to work under difficult political and material conditions in order 
to pursue the humanitarian objectives set by the European Community to 
provide support and relief to the Sudanese population who require 
assistance. Commends also the courageous work of the several non-
governmental organisations who continue to operate in different parts of 
the Sudan and pays hommage to those who have lost their life in the course 
of such activity. 
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